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VIRGINIA'S AFFILIATED TRANSACTIONS ARTICLE:
THE DEATH OF TWO-TIERED TAKEOVERS IN
VIRGINIA?
In February 1985 the Virginia General Assembly enacted a new corporate
code to modernize Virginia's corporate law. 1 Virginia's new corporate code,
the Virginia Stock Corporation Act (VSCA), contains several provisions to
protect Virginia corporations from hostile2 takeovers. 3 For example, the
Affiliated Transactions Article (ATA) of the VSCA restricts the use of
front-loaded, or two-tiered, takeovers. 4 By adopting the ATA, Virginia joins
several states that recently have enacted takeover statutes.5 The recent
1. Virginia Stock Corporation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 to -800 (1985) (VSCA).
In 1983 the Virginia General Assembly directed the Virginia Code Commission (Code Com-
mission) to revise chapters 1 and 2 of title 13.1 of the Code of Virginia, the then existing
Virginia corporate code, to make the Virginia corporate code clearer, better organized, and
more uniform. H.J. Res. 3, 1983 Va. Acts 1243. In January 1985 the Code Commission
submitted to the Virginia General Assembly and the Governor the Code Commission's report
on the revision of Virginia's corporate law. VA. CODE COMW'N, REPORT ON THE REvisION OF
CHAPTERS I AND 2 OF TITLE 13 OF TIE CODE OF VmGINIA, H. Doc. No. 13 (1985) [hereinafter
CODE COMUssION REPORT]. The Virginia General Assembly adopted the Code Commission's
revisions to Virginia's corporate law and the VSCA became effective on January 1, 1986. VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 to -800 (1985) (VSCA). The Affiliated Transactions Article (ATA) of
the VSCA became effective on July 1, 1985. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985)
(ATA). The VSCA closely parallels the provisions of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act (Model Act). See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 to - 800 (1985) (VSCA); REv. MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 1.01 - 17.06 (1984). Articles 1 through 13, 15 through 18, and Article
20 of the VSCA parallel exactly the Model Act.
2. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEnIBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZOUTS § 1.01[1] (1986). In
a hostile takeover attempt a bidder (raider) offers to purchase the stock of a corporation
(target company) through an offer to the shareholders of the target company without the
approval of the target company's management. Id. The raider attempts to purchase enough
of the target company's stock to gain control of the corporation. Id.
3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646 (1985) (allowing stock purchase rights plan); id. §
13.1-649 (restricting transfer of shares and other securities). Section 13.1-646 of the VSCA
permits the board of directors of a Virginia corporation to issue rights to purchase shares of
the corporation's stock under terms and conditions approved by the board. Id. § 13.1-646.
Section 13.1-649 of the VSCA authorizes a Virginia corporation to issue shares and other
securities that are not transferable to designated persons or classes of persons. Id. § 13.1-649.
Section 13.1-649 requires that the restriction on transferrability be for a "reasonable purpose"
and prohibits a "manifestly unreasonable" designation of the class of prohibited transferees.
Id.
4. Id. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); see CODE CommissioN REPORT, supra note 1,
at 68 (Virginia legislature intended ATA to restrict two-tiered takeovers); see also infra notes
12-16 and accompanying text (discussing two-tiered takeover).
5. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page Supp. 1986) (Ohio's new control share
acquisition takeover statute). Ohio was the first state to enact a control share acquisition
takeover statute. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at § 5.02[4][d] (explaining
that Ohio was model for control share acquisition statutes). A control share acquisition statute
typically requires that shareholders approve certain tender offers before a raider can complete
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outpouring of new state takeover legislation is attributable to the increased
number of takeover attempts6 and to the United States Supreme Court's
1982 decision in Edgar v. Mite Corp.7 striking down an Illinois takeover
the offer. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page Supp. 1986) (Ohio's control share
statute). For example, ihe Ohio statute governs tender offers in which a raider attempts to
acquire greater than 20%, 33.33070, or 50% of the stock of an Ohio corporation. Id. If a
raider initiates a tender offer for 21% of the stock of an Ohio corporation, for instance, the
Ohio statute requires that a quorum of a majority of the shares held by disinterested
shareholders of the corporation vote on the tender offer and that a majority of the voted
shares approve the offer. Id. Minnesota, Hawaii, Wisconsin, and Missouri have enacted post-
Mite takeover statutes similar to the Ohio statute. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1987) (Minnesota's post-Mite control share acquisition takeover statute); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.69 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (repealed 1985) (Wisconsin's post-Mite control share acquisition
takeover statute); HAw. REV. STAT. § 416-171 to -172 (Hawaii's post-Mite control share acquisition
statute); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.047 (Supp. 1987) (Missouri's post-Mite control share acquisition
takeover statute).
Pennsylvania's Shareholder Protection Act evidences a second type of post-Mite state
takeover statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986) (Pennsylvania post-
Mite takeover statute). The Pennsylvania statute requires persons acquiring 30% or more of
the voting stock of a Pennsylvania corporation to offer to pay other remaining shareholders
the fair value of the remaining shares. Id. A seperate provision of the Pennsylvania statute
inhibits two-tier takeovers by requiring that a majority of the disinterested shareholders of a
Pennsylvania corporation approve certain extraordinary transactions, including mergers. Id. §
1409.1(C).
The New York legislature has adopted a third type of state takeover statute. See N.Y. BusNwss
CoXPopArIoN LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). The New York statute provides that once a shareholder
has acquired more than 20% of the outstanding stock of certain New York corporations, that
shareholder may not enter into a business combination with the corporation for five years.
Id. For example, a raider may obtain more than 20% of a New York corporation's outstanding
stock in a tender offer. The raider cannot, however, then approve a second step transaction,
such as a merger or share exchange, for a period of five years. See id. Moreover, the New
York statute requires that after the five-year period expires, a majority of the disinterested
shareholders of the corporation must approve the business combination, or the raider must
satisfy the New York statute's fair price provision before the business combination can proceed.
Id.
Maryland was the first state to adopt the fourth common type of post-Mite state takeover
statute. See MD. Cops. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601 to- 3-603 (1985) (Maryland's post-Mite
takeover statute). Like the VSCA, Maryland's statute imposes supermajority voting require-
ments on the second step of two-tiered transactions. Id. § 3-602; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
726 (1985) (VSCA's supermajority voting requirement provision). Connecticut, Kentucky, and
Michigan enacted post-Mite takeover statutes similar to the Maryland statute. See 1984 Conn.
Acts § 84-431 (Reg. Sess.) (Connecticut's post-Mite takeover statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271A.39 to- 271A.399 (Baldwin 1981 & Supp. 1986) (Kentucky's post-Mite takeover statute);
MICI Comp'. LAWS AN. § 450.1775 to- 1784 (West Supp. 1987) (Michigan's post-Mite takeover
statute). Although Wisconsin enacted a control share acquisition statute after Mite, the Wiscon-
sin takeover statute also contained a supermajority provision similar to the Maryland takeover
statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1986) (supermajority provision in Wiscon-
sin's post-Mite takeover statute).
6. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at § 1.01 (discussing increased
incidence of takeover activity); Bus. WK., Mar. 4, 1985, at 80 (discussing increased numbers
of takeover attempts); Wall St. J., Jan. 1, 1986, at 6B, col.1 (discussing corporate takeover
activity in 1985).
7. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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statute as violating the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 8
Since Mite, state legislatures have attempted to draft new takeover legislation
that avoids the constitutional problems in the Illinois statute. 9 Although
federal courts have ruled on the constitutionality of several of the post-
Mite state takeover statutes, 10 the courts have not considered the constitu-
tionality of a takeover statute that was similar to the ATA.
The ATA restricts a corporate raider's ability to complete a two-tiered,
or front-loaded, takeover of a Virginia corporation." In a two-tiered take-
over, a raider initiates a cash tender offer for a controlling block of a target
company's outstanding shares. 12 After acquiring a majority of the outstand-
ing shares, the raider generally approves a second transaction in which the
target corporation merges with a shell corporation set up by the raider.
3
As a result of the merger, the remaining minority shareholders of the target
corporation must exchange their shares of the target corporation's stock for
stock in the newly formed corporation or other securities. 4 The value of
the securities or the stock in the shell corporation, however, generally is
substantially less than the cash offered in the original tender offer. 5 A two-
8. See Mite, 457 U.S. at 643; supra notes 44-83 and accompanying text (discussing
Mite) ; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause). The Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce among
the several states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting various new state takeover statutes).
10. See infra note 84 (discussing appellate court holdings on constitutionality of post-
Mite takeover statutes); infra notees 85-124 and accompanying text (discussing CTS decision).
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); see also supra note 4 and
accompanying text (Virginia legislature intended ATA to restrict two-tiered takeovers).
12. See I M. LIPTON & E. STEINmBRGER, supra note 2, at § 1.07[4][c] (describing mechanics
of two-tiered takeovers); Scriggins & Clark, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price
Legislation, 43 MD. L. REv. 266, 266-67 (1984) (describing operation of two-tiered takeovers).
13. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEIMBERGER, supra note 2, at § 1.07[4][c] (second step of
two-tiered takeover generally is merger of target corporation into shell corporation); Scriggins
& Clark, supra note 12, at 266 (same).
14. See I M. LIPTON & E. STEINBEROER, supra note 2, at § 1.07[4][c] (explaining raider's
ability to force remaining shareholders to exchange securities of target company for securities
of shell corporation); Scriggins & Clark, supra note 12, at 266 (same).
15. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBEROER, supra note 2, at § 1.0714][c] (securities of shell
corporation generally have less value than securities in target company). Several recent two-
tiered takeovers illustrate the discrepancy between the price raiders offer for a target company's
stock in the first-step of the takeover and the consideration the target company's shareholders
receive for the company's stock in the second-stage. Id. The DuPont Corp. (Dupont) used the
two-tiered approach successfully to acquire Conoco, Inc. (Conoco). Id. Dupont paid $98 cash
for 4507o of Conoco's stock in the tender offer phase of the two-tiered takeover. Id. After the
original tender offer, DuPont offered to the remaining Conoco shareholders 1.7 shares of
DuPont stock with a market value on the date of the bid of $77.56 and a market value on
the date of exchange of $72.68, in exchange for one share of Conoco stock. Id. Similarly,
Allegheny International Inc. (Allegheny) used the two-tier technique successfully to acquire
Sunbeam Corporation (Sunbeam). Id. Allegheny offered $41 cash for 50% of Sunbeam's stock
in the original tender offer. Id. In the second step of the transaction, Allegheny offered to
the remaining minority shareholders of Sunbeam stock in new Allegheny International Cor-
poration worth $29 per share. Id.; see also Scriggins & Clark, supra note 12, at 266-67 (securities
of shell corporation generally have less value than securities in target company).
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tiered takeover, therefore, coerces shareholders of the target corporation
into tendering in the first stage of the takeover when the value of the
shareholder's stock is at a premium.1
6
The ATA provides that two-thirds of the disinterested holders of the
voting stock of a Virginia corporation must approve any "affiliated trans-
action" between the corporation and an "interested shareholder" in that
corporation. 17 Under the ATA, an interested shareholder is any person
16. See 1 F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORrry SHARE-
HOLDERS § 5:26(A) (1986) (discussing coercion inherent in two-tiered takeover). An element of
coercion is inherent in a two-tiered takeover because shareholders of the target company recognize
that the raider will offer a higher price for the target company's stock in the first step of the take-
over than the price offered in the second step merger of the target with the raider's shell company.
Id. The price discrepancy between the first step and the second step of a two-tiered takeover, in ef-
fect, whipsaws or hurries individual shareholders of the target company into tendering their shares
in the first step of the takeover. Id. Individual shareholders fear that, if they do not tender
immediately, enough other shareholders will accept the raider's offer to enable the raider to approve
a second-step merger and pay remaining shareholders of the target company less consideration than
shareholders who tendered immediately. Id. If shareholders of the target company did not tender
during the first stage of a two-tiered takeover, the shareholders could force the raider to pay
a higher price for the target company's stock in the initial tender offer. Id. Because shareholders
cannot coordinate their actions, however, a raider can pay less to acquire a target company.
Id. See also Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CALn. L. REv. 1073, 1118 (1983) (discussing coercion inherent in two-
tiered takeovers); Brudney & Chirlestein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezouts, 87 YALE L.
REv. 1354, 1360-62 (1978) (same); Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation
of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 679 (1984) (same); Note, Protecting
Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97
HAgv. L. REv. 1964, 1966 (1984) (same).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently adopted a regulation intended
to curb the coercive nature of two-tier takeover bids. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983) (Rule
14d-8) (SEC's regulation on two-tiered takeovers). Rule 14d-8 provides that a raider must
accept, on a pro rata basis, shares tendered for the duration of a tender offer. Id. Prior to
Rule 14d-8, a raider had to accept pro rata only those shares tendered within 10 calendar days
of the offer's commencement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1981). The SEC enacted Rule 14d-
8 to provide all shareholders of a target company time to tender the shareholders stock. See
Comment, The Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offer, 78 NW. U. L. REv. 811, 812-
14 (1983) (discussing Rule 14d-8 and its effect on two-tiered bids).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-726 (1985) (voting requirements for affiliated transactions).
The requirement under the ATA that 2/3 of the disinterested shareholders of a Virginia
corporation must approve any affiliated transaction applies in addition to, not in lieu of, other
voting provisions in the VSCA. See id. § 13.1-718 (VSCA's voting provision governing mergers
outside ATA); Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L.
REv. 67,125 (1985) (ATA's 2/3 voting requirement applies in addition to other voting provisions
in VSCA). For example, if a Delaware corporation owned 51% of a Virginia corporation's
stock and wanted to merge the Virginia corporation into the Delaware corporation, § 13.1-
718 of the VSCA would require that 2/3 of the Virginia corporation's voting stock approve
the transaction, including the 51% owned by the Delaware corporation. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-718 (1985) (VSCA voting provision on mergers and share exchanges); Murphy, supra,
at 125 (giving example of merger provisions of VSCA). In addition to the VSCA's requirment
that 2/3 of the shares entitled to vote under § 13.1-718 of the VSCA approve the merger, the
ATA would require that 2/3 of the disinterested 49% also approve the transaction. VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-718 (1985) (VSCA voting provision on mergers and share exchanges). See id. § 13.1-
726 (ATA's voting provisions for certain mergers and similar transactions).
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beneficially owning more than ten percent of a Virginia corporation's
outstanding stock.' 8 The ATA defines an affiliated transaction to include
any merger of a Virginia corporation with an interested shareholder, or any
share exchange in which an interested shareholder acquires one or more
classes or series of voting stock of the corporation.1 9 This aspect of the
definition of affiliated transaction hinders the second step of a typical two-
tiered takeover in which a raider attempts to merge the target corporation
with a shell corporation.20 The definition hinders the second step of a two-
tiered takeover because the ATA requires that two-thirds of a target com-
pany's disinterested shareholders approve a merger with an interested share-
holder, as opposed to the VSCA's usual requirement that two-thirds of all
shareholders approve mergers or similar transactions with a noninterested
shareholder.
2'
In addition to mergers with interested shareholders and certain share
exchanges, the ATA's definition of affiliated transaction includes any sale,
lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer, or other disposition of a Virginia
corporation's assets to an interested shareholder. 22 The ATA limits coverage
under this aspect of the definition to transactions that are out of the
ordinary course of the corporation's business and that dispose of five
percent or more of the corporation's assets during any twelve-month pe-
riod. 2 This definitional provision prevents a raider from approving a
transaction designed to squeeze the target company's minority shareholders
out of the corporation without first obtaining approval for the transaction
from two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders. 24 For example, without
18. Id. § 13.1-725 (defining interested shareholder). An interested shareholder under the
ATA is any person beneficially owning more than 10% of a Virginia corporation's outstanding
stock, except the corporation, the corporation's subsidiaries, or the corporation's employee
stock ownership and benefit plans. Id. Under the ATA, a person is a beneficial owner of
voting shares to which such person and such person and such person's affiliates and associates,
individually or in the aggregate, have or share directly or indirectly voting power or investment
power or the right to acquire voting or investment power. Id. The ATA's definition of
beneficial owner prohibits a shareholder of a Virginia corporation from setting up related but
separate entities to avoid application of the ATA. See Goolsby & Whitson, Virginia's New
Corporate Code, 19 REv. SEc. & ColsoDrrms REG. 147, 148 (1986)) (ATA's definition of
beneficial owner prevents shareholder from avoiding application of ATA).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (1985).
20. See id. (ATA's definition of affiliated transaction); Scriggins & Clark, supra note
12, at 275 (explaining effect of Maryland takeover statute's definition of business combination
which parallels ATA's definition of affiliated transaction); see also supra note 5 and accom-
panying text (ATA parallels Maryland's takeover statute, which imposes supermajority voting
requirements on mergers and similar transactions).
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-726 (1985) (ATA's 2/3 voting requirement for affiliated
transactions); id. § 13.1-718 (VSCA's requirement that 2/3 of all shareholders must approve
mergers with disinterested shareholders).
22. Id. § 13.1-725.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see Scriggins & Clark, supra note 12, at 275-76 (explaining effect of provision
in Maryland's takeover statute, which, like the ATA, defines a business combination to include
any sale, lease, or exchange).
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the ATA, a raider could buy all of a target company's assets, liquidate the
assets, and thus leave no corporation in which shareholders can hold stock.
25
The ATA's definition of affiliated transaction similarly includes a sale
or other disposition by a Virginia corporation to an interested shareholder
of more than five percent of the voting shares of the corporation. 26 The
ATA determines whether the sale or other disposition meets the definition's
five percent requirement by aggregating all transactions occurring during
any twelve-month period. 27 After acquiring control of a Virginia corporation,
therefore, a raider cannot attempt to first offer for sale and then buy the
corporation's authorized but unissued stock without the approval of two-
thirds of the corporation's disinterested shareholders. 28 Accordingly, the
ATA restricts a raider's ability to obtain two-thirds of a Virginia corpora-
tion's stock by buying previously unissued stock of the corporation.
29
Although owning two-thirds of a Virginia corporation's stock does not
permit an interested shareholder to approve an affiliated transaction, the
interested shareholder can sell the stock to a third party ally who then
might vote to approve the affiliated transaction.
30
The ATA contains several exceptions to the requirement that two-thirds
of the disinterested shareholders of a Virginia corporation must approve
any affiliated transaction.3 1 For example, the ATA provides that approval
of an affiliated transaction by a majority of the disinterested directors of
a Virginia corporation preempts the need for an affirmative vote of two-
thirds of the corporation's disinterested shareholders. 2 This exception allows
25. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 12, at 275 (explaining effect of provision in
Maryland's takeover statute, which, like the ATA, defines business combination to include
any sale, lease, or exchange).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (1985). The definition under the ATA of affiliated
transaction also includes the reclassification of securities or any corporate reorganization that
increases by more than five percent the percentage of stock held by an interested shareholder
who was not an interested shareholder for at least five years prior to the transaction. Id. The
definition of affiliated transaction additionally includes the dissolution of a Virginia corporation
if an interested shareholder proposes the dissolution. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. § 13.1-726 (2/3 of corporation's disinterested shareholders must approve
affiliated transactions); Scriggins & Clark, supra note 12, at 276 (explaining effects of provision
in Maryland's takeover statute, which, like the ATA's definition of affiliated transaction,
defines business combination to include sale or other disposition of a Maryland corporation's
assets).
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (1985) (ATA's definition of affiliated transaction
restricts sale of Virginia corporation's voting stock).
30. See id. § 13.1-726 (requiring that 2/3 of disinterested shareholders approve affili-
ated transactions). Acquiring 2/3 of a Virginia corporation's voting stock does not allow
a raider to approve an affiliated transaction because only the votes of disinterested shareholders
count in the decision to approve an affiliated transaction. Id.
31. See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions in ATA to 2/3
voting requirement).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985). The ATA defines a disinterested director as any
member of the board of directors of a Virginia corporation who was a board member before
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a board of directors to avoid any application of the statute to an unintended
situation.33 For example, the disinterested director exception allows a board
of directors of a Virginia corporation to approve a friendly 4 acquisition of
the corporation through a tender offer and merger, or merger alone, without
triggering the ATA's disinterested shareholder voting rules.35
In addition to the ATA's disinterested director exception, the ATA
exempts from the two-thirds voting requirement any interested shareholder
complying with the ATA's fair price exception. 6 The ATA's fair price
exception requires that, to escape the two-thirds voting requirement, a raider
must pay the shareholders of each class or series of voting stock who did
not tender in the first phase of a two-tiered takeover the fair value of their
shares.3 7 The ATA's fair price exception ensures that shareholders receive
the later of January 1, 1985 or the determination date. Id. § 13.1-725. The ATA defines
determination date as the date a shareholder of a Virginia corporation becomes an interested
shareholder. Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (ATA's definition of interested
shareholder). Additionally, the ATA provides that any member of the board of directors
elected with the approval of a majority of the disinterested directors then on the board is a
disinterested director. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (1985). A Virginia corporation can opt out
of the ATA's definition of disinterested director by so stating in the corporation's articles of
incorporation. Id.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985); see Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 149
(disinterested director exception prevents application of ATA to unintended situations).
34. See I M. LEPToN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at § 1.0112] (describing friendly
takeover). In a friendly takeover a raider and a target company's management negotiate the
final terms of the takeover offer, including the amount and nature of the consideration paid
to shareholders of the target company. Id.
35. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-726 (1985) (ATA's 2/3 disinterested shareholder voting
requirement for affiliated transactions); id. § 13.1-727 (ATA's disinterested director exception
to 2/3 disinterested shareholder voting requirement); see also Murphy, supra note 17, at 126
& n.154 (noting that ATA's disinterested director exception allows directors to escape special
voting requirements in typical friendly mergers).
36. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985) (fair price exception to ATA's 2/3 voting
requirement).
37. See id. (ATA's fair value exception to ATA's 2/3 voting requirement). Prior to
invoking the ATA's fair price exception, an interested shareholder must comply with certain
procedural requirements intended to prevent self-dealing or manipulation of the market price
of the corporation's shares. Id.; see Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 149 (explaining
ATA's procedural prerequisites to invoking fair price exception). The ATA's fair price exception
only applies to a target corporation that has paid or has not reduced the rate of periodic
dividends since the interested shareholder became an interested shareholder. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-727 (1985); see Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 149 (application of ATA's fair
price exception depends on rate of target corporation's dividend payments). In addition, to
qualify for the ATA's fair price exception, the interested shareholder must not have obtained
beneficial ownership of any additional voting shares since becoming an interested shareholder.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985); see Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 149 (application
of ATA's fair price exception dependent on whether interested shareholder obtained beneficial
ownership of additional voting shares). The ATA also provides that to qualify for the fair
price exception, the interested shareholder must not have received any loans or other financial
assistance or tax advantage from the corporation since becoming an interested shareholder.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985); see Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 149 (application
of ATA's fair price exception dependent on whether interested shareholder received loans or
1987] 1109
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either the same dollar value as the interested shareholder paid for other
shares of the same class during the two-year period preceding the first
public announcement of the proposed affiliated transaction, or the fair
value of the shares on the date the affiliated transaction is announced to
the public.38
The ATA also exempts from the two-thirds voting requirement any
affiliated transaction with an interested shareholder who already owns ninety
percent of a Virginia corporation's outstanding voting shares or who has
held eighty percent of the outstanding voting shares for at least five years.3 9
other financial assistance). The ATA additionally requires that shareholders of the target
company receive a proxy or information statement describing the affiliated transaction 25 days
before consummating the affiliated transaction. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985); see Goolsby
& Whitson, supra note 18, at 149 (under ATA interested shareholder required to prepare an
information statement for shareholders of the target company). The ATA allows a majority
of a target company's disinterested directors to forego these procedural requirements by so
stating in the company's articles of incorporation. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985); see
Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 149 (target company's disinterested directors can opt
out of ATA's procedural requirements).
38. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985) (defining fair value under ATA). The ATA
specifically defines fair value for shares other than preferred shares as an amount at least
equal to the greater of: (a) the highest per share price paid by the interested shareholder in
acquiring voting shares during the two-year period (Preannouncement Period) before the date
of the first public announcement of the proposed affiliated transaction (Announcement Date)
or, if greater, in the transaction in which it became an interested shareholder; or (b) the fair
market value per share on the Announcement Date or, if greater, on the date on which such
person became an interested shareholder (Determination Date); or (c) the fair market value
calculated under clause (b) times the highest premium the interested shareholder has paid in
acquiring any voting shares in the Preannouncement Period. Id. The commentary on the Code
Commission Report proposing the VSCA offers a helpful example of the application of the
fair value provision. See CODE CoMIassIoN REPORT, supra note 1, at 69-70 (comments of the
Virginia Bar Association/Virginia State Bar Title 13.1 Joint Bar Committee on Code Com-
mission Report). The commentary on the Code Commission Report provided an example of
how the ATA's fair value provision works. Id. at 70. The Code Commission's example assumed
that an interested shareholder paid cash for nonpreference voting shares of a Virginia corpo-
ration. Id. The highest price paid by the interested shareholder during the Preannouncement
Period was $35 per share, and the fair market value of the voting shares on the date of the
interested shareholder's first purchase, on the Determination Date, and on the Announcement
Date was $30, $32, and $40, respectively. Id. According to the Code Commission's example,
the ATA's fair value exception would entitle the remaining shareholders of the target corpo-
ration to the amount per share in cash equal to the highest of: (a) $35 (the highest price paid);
(b) $40 (fair market value on the Announcement Date); or (c) $46.67 (fair market value on
the Announcement Date of $40 times a premium of 1.17, calculated by dividing $35 by $30).
Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985) (ATA's fair value exception). Accordingly, under
the Code Commission's example, a raider must pay $46.67 to the shareholders of the target
corporation to escape the ATA's 2/3 voting requirement. CODE COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, at 69-70; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-726 (1985) (ATA's 2/3 voting requirement).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985) (allowing exception to 2/3 voting requirement for
90% and 80% shareholders). In drafting the ATA's 90% and 80% exception to the 2/3 voting
requirement, the Virginia General Assembly may have realized that even if a raider's tender
offer for the stock of a target company is well-priced, not every shareholder of the target
company will tender. See id. (allowing exception to 2/3 voting requirement for 90% and 80%
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The two-thirds voting requirement is similarly inapplicable, under the ATA,
to any Virginia corporation with less than three hundred shareholders of
record over the last three years, or to any investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 0 Moreover, any Virginia
corporation can opt out of coverage under the ATA by so providing in the
corporation's articles of incorporation.
4'
Courts have not addressed the constitutionality of the ATA's restriction
on a corporate raider's ability to complete the second step of a two-tiered
takeover. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. Mite
Corp.,42 however, is the benchmark for determining the constitutionality of
a state takeover statute.4 3 In Mite the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of Illinois' takeover statute. 4 The Illinois statute
required that a raider who offered to acquire more than five percent of a
target company's stock register the tender offer with the Illinois Secretary
of State.45 The Illinois statute defined a target company as a corporation
in which shareholders located in Illinois owned ten percent of the stock
subject to a takeover offer.4 6 The Illinois statute further provided that a
tender offer became registered twenty days after the filing of a registration
statement with the Secretary of State.4 7 Additionally, if a majority of the
target company's outside directors or shareholders owning ten percent of
the stock subject to the offer requested a hearing, the Illinois statute required
the Secretary to hold a hearing. 48 During the twenty-day period between the
filing of the registration statement and the actual registration of the tender
shareholders); Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 150 (veil-priced tender offer does not draw
all shares into tender offer pool). Because a well-priced tender offer may not draw all shares
into the tender offer pool, the ATA provides that a raider who acquires 90% or who holds 80%
of a target company's stock for five years is entitled to complete the acquisition without complying
with the 2/3 voting requirement. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985) (ATA's 90% and 80%
exception to 2/3 voting requirement); Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 150 (explaining
unfairness of applying ATA's 2/3 voting requirement to 90% or 80% shareholders).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985); see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to b-21 (1984) (Investment
Company Act of 1940).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728 (1985). The ATA permits a Virginia corporation to escape
the ATA's coverage if 2/3 of the disinterested shareholders of the corporation approve an
amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation providing that the ATA is inapplicable
to that corporation. Id.
42. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
43. See infra notes 44-83 and accompanying text (discussing Mite).
44. Id.; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121.5, para. 137.51 to- 137.70 (1979) (repealed 1983)
(Illinois takeover statute in Mite).
45. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1982); see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121.5,
para. 137.54.A (1979) (repealed 1983) (tender offer registration requirement).
46. Mite, 457 U.S. at 627; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121.5, para. 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed
1983) (defining target company).
47. Mite, 457 U.S. at 627; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121.5, para 137.54E (1979) (repealed
1983) (profiding when registration occurs).
48. Mite, 457 U.S. at 627; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121.5, para 137.57.A (1979) (repealed
1983) (Secretary must call hearing at request of minority of outside directors of certain Illinois
shareholders).
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offer, the Illinois statute also allowed the Secretary of State to call a hearing
to adjudicate the fairness of the offer. 49 The Illinois statute permitted the
Secretary of State to veto an offer the Secretary considered unfair to protect
the shareholders of the target company. 0
In Mite, Mite Corporation (Mite), a Delaware corporation with principal
offices in Connecticut, initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding
shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Company (Chicago Rivet), an Illinois
corporation, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in compliance with the Williams Act." Mite did not
register its takeover offer with the Illinois Secretary of State, however, and
thus failed to comply with the Illinois statute.5 2 Mite subsequently filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois seeking a declaratory judgement that the Williams Act pre-empted
the Illinois statute and that the statute violated the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. 3 Additionally, Mite sought a preliminary
49. Mite, 457 U.S. at 627; see In. Ray. STAT. ch. 121.1, para. 137.57.A (1979) (repealed
1983) (providing Secretary with power to call hearing on fairness of offer).
50. Mite, 457 U.S. at 627, see ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 121.5, para. 137.57.E (1979) (repealed
1983) (allowing Secretary to deny registration for unfair tender offer).
5I. Mite, 457 U.S. at 627. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1981) (Williams Act).
In Mite, Mite's Schedule 14D-1 indicated that Mite's offering price for all outstanding shares
of Chicago Rivet was $28 per share, which was four dollars above the prevailing market price.
Mite, 457 U.S. at 627-28.
In 1968 Congress enacted the Williams Act, which added §§ 13(d), 13(e), and 14(d)-(f) to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). See Pub. L. No.90-439, 82 Stat. 454-57 (1968)
(Williams Act amendment to Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of
the '34 Act impose regulations on tender offers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1981) (§ 14 of '34
Act). Section 14(d)(1) of the '34 Act requires a raider seeking to obtain more than five percent
of any class of equity security through a tender offer first to file a Schedule 14D-1 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. A Schedule 1413-1 is a statement requiring disclosure of
material information on the bidder and the bid, including the number of shares the offeror is seeking
and the price the offeror will pay for the shares, and requiring disclosure of other information
if the information is material to a decision on the tender offer by the target's shareholders.
Id. Section 14(d)(1) also requires an offeror to publish or send a statement of the relevant facts con-
tained in the Schedule 14D-1 to the target company's shareholders. Id. The Williams Act requires
that tender offers remain open for not less than 20 business days. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-l(a) (1987).
The Williams Act permits investors who tender their shares to withdraw the shares during the
first 15 days of the offer or at any time after 60 days from the commencement of the offer
if the offeror has not yet purchased them. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1981). If a tender offer is for less
than all of the outstanding shares of a target company, and the target company's shareholders
tender more than the requested shares, the Williams Act requires the offeror to purchase the
shares on a pro rata basis. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
In addition to imposing requirements on tender offers, § 14(d) of the '34 Act requires
that an offeror disclose any plans for a second-step transaction involving the target company
in the offeror's Schedule 14d-1. Id. § 78n(d). In addition, § 14(e) of the '34 Act proscribes
material misstatements, misleading omissions, and fraudulent or manipulative acts in connection
with any tender offer regardless of whether the offeror will obtain ownership in more than
five percent of the target company's stock. Id. § 78n(e).




injunction prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from enforcing the
Illinois statute against Mite. 54 The district court enjoined the Illinois Sec-
retary of State from enforcing the Illinois statute against Mite's tender offer
for the shares of Chicago Rivet."5 The district court later found that the
Williams Act pre-empted the Illinois statute and that the statute violated
the Commerce Clause. 56 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld the district court's Williams Act and Commerce Clause
holdings." The Illinois Secretary of State appealed the Seventh Circuit's ruling
to the United States Supreme Court. 8
In considering the constitutionality of the Illinois statute, the Supreme
Court in Mite first examined whether the Illinois statute frustrated the
objectives of the Williams Act and, therefore, violated the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution. 59 The Supreme Court in Mite noted that
Congress drafted the Williams Act to protect investors by requiring raiders
to furnish detailed tender offer information to the SEC, the target company,
54. Id. In Mite, Chicago Rivet responded to Mite's request for a preliminary injunction
by bringing suit in Pennsylvania, where Chicago Rivet conducted business, to enjoin Mite's
tender offer. Id. Chicago Rivet argued that Mite's tender offer violated Pennsylvania's takeover
statute. Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 71 to- 85 (Purdon Supp. 1986). In addition to filing
suit in Pennsylvania state court, Chicago Rivet filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Securities
Commission (Commission) requesting that the Commission enforce Pennsylvania's takeover
statute against Mite. Mite, 457 U.S. at 628 & n.3. The Commission rejected Chicago Rivet's
request and, subsequently, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, to which Mite had removed the state court action, denied Chicago Rivet's
request for an injunction. Id.
55. Mite, 457 U.S. at 629. In Mite, after the Illinois district court enjoined the Illinois
Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois statute against Mite, Mite published the tender
offer for $28 per share in the Wall Street Journal. Id.; see Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1979, at 3.
On the same day, Chicago Rivet offered $30 per share for 400 of Chicago Rivet's outstanding
stock. Mite, 457 U.S. at 629.
56. Mite, 457 U.S. at 629. After the Illinois district court entered final judgement against
Chicago Rivet and the Illinois Secretary of State in Mite, Mite and Chicago Rivet entered into
an agreement withdrawing Mite's tender offer and Chicago Rivet's tender offer for its own
stock, and allowing Mite 30 days to examine Chicago Rivet's books and records. Id. The
agreement provided that Mite either would tender an offer of $31 per share, which Chicago
Rivet would not oppose, or that Mite would tender no offer. Id. at 629-30. Mite decided not
to make a tender offer. Id. at 630.
57. Id.; see Mite Corp v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Seventh Circuit's decision). In
addition to upholding the district court's Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause holdings, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Mite found that the case was not moot
even though Mite decided ultimately not to make a tender offer for the shares of Chicago Rivet. Id.
The Seventh Circuit explained that reversing the district court's judgement would expose Mite to
civil and criminal liability because Mite violated the Illinois Act by making the tender offer
and, therefore, the case was not moot. Id. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the
Seventh Circuit that the case was not moot. Id.
58. See Mite, 457 U.S. at 624 (1982) (Supreme Court's decision in Mite); see infra notes
59-83 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Mite).
59. Mite, 457 U.S. at 630; see U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (federal constitution and
statutes are supreme law of land).
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and the shareholders of the target company. 6° The Supreme Court in Mite
recognized that Congress intended the Williams Act to protect investors
without favoring either the target company's management or the raider.
6'
Three Justices of the Court in Mite found, however, that the Illinois statute's
twenty-day preregistration notification requirement, a provision not found
in the Williams Act, violated the Supremacy Clause. 62 The three Justices
found that unlike the Williams Act, the Illinois statute's twenty-day regis-
tration period unduly favored management of target companies over raiders
by permitting a target company time to defeat a tender offer.63 Additionally,
the three Justices maintained that, by allowing the Secretary of State to
veto a tender offer that the Secretary considered unfair, the Illinois statute
upset the Williams Act's policy of allowing investors freedom to accept or
reject tender offers."' The three Justices found, therefore, that the Illinois
statute violated the Supremacy Clause.
65
After considering the Supremacy Clause issue, the Supreme Court in Mite
considered whether the Illinois statute was constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution. 66 The Supreme Court in
Mite articulated two distinct parts to its Commerce Clause analysis. 67 The
Court in Mite first considered whether the Illinois statute violated the
Commerce Clause by directly regulating interstate commerce. 68 The Court
explained that Mite was a Delaware corporation and that, accordingly,
Mite's tender offer to Chicago Rivet's shareholders located in Illinois and
across the country, if accepted, constituted an interstate transaction. 69 Four
Justices of the Supreme Court in Mite found that the Illinois statute
prevented Mite from consummating the company's tender offer to non-
Illinois shareholders of Chicago Rivet. 7 0 The four Justices held that by
60. Mite, 457 U.S. at 632; see supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining provisions
of Williams Act governing tender offers).
61. Mite, 457 U.S. at 633.
62. Id. 634-36; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121.5, para. 137.54.E (1979) (repealed 1983) (20-
day registration for tender offers).
63. Mite, 457 U.S. at 635; see ILL REv. STAT. ch. 121.5, para 137.54.E (1979) (20-day
registration requirement for tender offers).
64. Mite, 457 U.S. at 639-40. Comprising the plurality on the Supremacy Clause issue,
Justices White, Burger, and Blackmun found that the Illinois statute violated the Supremacy
Clause. Id. Justices Powell and Stevens found that the Williams Act policy of neutrality did
not prohibit state legislation designed to specially protect incumbent management. Id. at 646-
47, 655. Justices Powell and Stevens found, therefore, that the Illinois statute did not violate
the Supremacy Clause. Id. Justice O'Connor found that the Illinois takeover statute violated
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and did not reach the Supremacy
Clause issue. Id. at 655. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist dissented from the Court's
entire opinion. Id. at 655-66.
65. Id. at 634-40.
66. Id. at 640; see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power to regulate
interstate commerce).
67. Mite, 457 U.S. at 640.
68. Id. at 641-43; see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).
69. Mite, 457 U.S. at 641-42.
70. Id. at 642.
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preventing Mite from completing interstate tender offers, the Illinois statute
placed a direct burden on interstate commerce and violated the Commerce
Clause.
7 1
The Supreme Court in Mite explained that even if the Illinois statute
did not directly burden interstate commerce, under the second prong of the
Court's Commerce Clause analysis the Illinois statute may have placed an
impermissible indirect burden on interstate commerce. 72 The Court noted
that indirect state regulation of interstate commerce is constitutional only
if the burden on commerce is not excessive in relation to the local interests
that the state statute serves. 73 The Secretary of State of Illinois argued that
the Illinois statute furthered two legitimate local interests. 74 The Secretary
claimed that the Illinois statute protected Illinois shareholders and regulated
the internal affairs of companies incorporated in Illinois. 75 The Supreme
Court in Mite explained, however, that the Illinois statute protected non-
resident shareholders and, although Illinois had an interest in protecting
resident shareholders, the state had no legitimate interest in protecting
nonresidents. 76 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Mite found that the Illinois
statute's twenty-day registration period did not provide more protection for
Illinois shareholders than the protection provided by the Williams Act and
did not increase, therefore, the shareholder's ability to make informed
decisions. 77 The Court in Mite also rejected the Secretary of State's argument
that the Illinois statute permissibly regulated the internal affairs of Illinois
corporations. 78 The Court explained that tender offers generally involve
71. Id. Justices White, Burger, Stevens, and O'Connor found in Mite that the Illinois
statute directly burdened interstate commerce. Id. at 625.
72. Id. at 643.
73. Id. The Supreme Court in Mite followed the Court's decision in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. to formulate the second prong of the Mite Court's Commerce Clause test. Id.;
see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (formulating two-part test to
determine constitutionality of state regulation of interstate commerce).
74. Mite, 457 U.S. at 644; see infra text accompanying note 75 (describing Secretary's
argument supporting Illinois statute).
75. Mite, 457 U.S. at 644.
76. Id. In addition to finding that the Illinois statute protected nonresident shareholders,
the Supreme Court in Mite noted that the Illinois statute exempted an Illinois corporation's
acquisition of the corporation's own shares from coverage. Id. The Supreme Court in Mite
noted the inconsistency in allowing Chicago Rivet potentially to harm resident shareholders by
making a tender offer for its own shares without complying with the Illinois statute, yet
requiring other offerors to comply with the statute. Id.
77. Id. at 644-45. The Supreme Court in Mite noted that the disclosures that the Illinois
statute required and the timing provisions of the Illinois statute, which went beyond the
disclosures and timing provisions of the Williams Act, did not enhance substantially a
shareholder's ability to make informed decisions. Id. at 645. See ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 121.5,
para 137.54.E, 137.59.C, 137.59.D, 137.59.E (1979) (repealed 1983) (20-day registration,
withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration rights requirements); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5), to
-(d)(7) (1981) (Williams Act provisions governing withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration
rights); 17 C.F.R. 240.1,4e-1(a) (1981) (Williams Act provision requiring tender offers to remain
open for 20 days).
78. Mite, 457 U.S. at 645.
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transfers of stock from stockholders to a third party. 79 The Court maintained
that because tender offers involve parties from outside the corporation,
tender offers do not involve only the target company's internal affairs.8 0
The Supreme Court in Mite also noted that the Illinois statute regulated
tender offers for any corporation in which Illinois residents held ten percent
of the outstanding shares."' The Court in Mite found that because the
Illinois statute potentially applied to companies incorporated in another
state, the Secretary's internal affairs argument was untenable. 2 A majority
of the Supreme Court in Mite held, therefore, that the Illinois statute
excessively burdened interstate commerce in relation to the local interests
served by the statute and thus was unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause.83
In response to Mite many state legislatures drafted new corporate take-
over statutes.84 The United States Supreme Court recently has ruled on the
79. Id.
80. Id. The internal affairs of a corporation are the relations between shareholders,
directors, and officers of the corporation, as opposed to external affairs, which pertain to
transactions between the corporation and the rest of the world. See Sargent, Do the Second-
Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CoRP. L. REv. 3, 16-17
(1985) (explaining internal affairs doctrine).
81. Mite, 457 U.S. at 645.
82. Id. at 645-46.
83. Id. at 646. Although Justice Powell concurred in Mite with the holding that the
Illinois statute was unconstitutional under the second part of the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis, Justice Powell concurred because he felt the holding allowed some state regulation
of tender offers. Id.
84. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting new state takeover legislation). In
Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
considered the constitutionality of Minnesota's takeover statute. Cardiff Acquisitons, Inc v.
Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984); see MIIN. STAT. 80B.01 to- B.13 (1986) (Minnesota
takeover statute). In Cardiff the Minnesota statute governed any tender offer to purchase
stock of a target company from Minnesota residents, which offer would allow the offeror to
own more than 10% of any class of stock of the target company. MrNN. STAT. § 80B.01(8)
(1986). If Minnesota shareholders owned 20% of a corporation's stock and the corporation
had "substantial assets" in Minnesota, the Minnesota statute classified the corporation as a
target company. Id. § 80B.01(9). The Minnesota statute required that prior to commencing a
tender offer, an offeror must file a registration statement detailing information about the
tender offer with the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce (Commissioner). Id. § 80B.03(2),
(6). The Minnesota statute required an offeror to include in the registration statement
information on the effect of a takeover on the target company's operations, employees,
suppliers, customers, and the community at large. Id. § 80B.03(6)(c). Under the Minnesota
statute, the Commissioner had three days after the filing of the registration statement to
suspend the tender offer for Minnesota residents if the registration statement was insufficient.
Id. § 80B.03(4)(a). The Minnesota statute provided that within 10 calendar days of the
suspension of the registration statement, the Commissioner must hold a hearing on whether
to veto permanently the tender offer. Id. § 80B.03(5). The statute further required the
Commissioner to determine the ultimate propriety of the tender offer within three calendar
days of the hearing, but no more than 16 days after the initial suspension. Id.
In Cardiff, Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. and Cardiff Equities Corporation (Cardiff) initiated
a tender offer for all outstanding shares of Conwed Corp. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v.
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constitutionality of one new state takeover statute. In Dynamics Corp. of
Hatch, 597 F. Supp. 1493, 1495 (1D. Minn. 1984) (district court opinion). On the same day
Cardiff initiated the tender offer, Cardiff also filed a complaint with the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota requesting injunctive relief to prevent the Commissioner
from enforcing the Minnesota statute against Cardiff. Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 908. The district
court held that the Minnesota statute did not violate either the Supremacy or the Commerce
Clause and dismissed Cardiff's request for injunctive relief. Id. Cardiff appealed the district
court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit first considered whether the Minnesota statute violated the
Commerce Clause under Mite. Id. at 909; Mite, 457 U.S. at 640-46. In determining whether
the Minnesota statute violated the Commerce Clause under Mite, the Cardiff court noted that,
unlike the Illinois statute in Mite, the Minnesota statute did not provide for a preregistration
filing period or require the Commissioner in certain circumstances to call a heari'g on the
fairness of a tender offer. Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 910; see supra notes 66-83 and accompanying
text (discussing Commerce Clause holding in Mite). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit noted
that, although the Illinois statute in Mite potentially governed tender offers from nonresident
raiders to out-of-state shareholders, the Minnesota statute in Cardiff only suspended tender
offers to Minnesota Residents. Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 911; see MINN. STAT. § 80B.01(8) (1986)
(Minnesota statute only applies to Minnesota residents); supra notes 45-50 and accompanying
text (dicussing Illinois statute in Mite). The Eighth Circuit recognized that, moreover, the
Minnesota statute, unlike the Illinois statute in Mite, did not permit the Commissioner to call
a hearing and decide on the substantive fairness of a tender offer. Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 911;
see MiNN. STAT. § 80B.01 to -.13 (1986) (no provision in Minnesota statute allowing commissioner
to decide on substantive fairness of tender offer); supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text
(discussing Illinois statute in Mite). The Eighth Circuit found, therefore, that the Minnesota
statute interjected no delay into the tender offer process and did not unduly favor target
management over a raider. Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 910-11. The Eighth Circuit held, accordingly,
that the Minnesota statute did not place an excessive burden on interstate commerce and,
therefore, did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. 910-12.
After determining that the Minnesota statute did not violate the Commerce Clause, the
Eighth Circuit considered whether the Minnesota statute violated the Supremacy Clause.
Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 912; see U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). Cardiff, the
raider, argued that the Minnesota statute conflicted with the Williams Act and, therefore,
violated the Supremacy Clause by empowering the Commissioner to suspend tender offers for
an inadequate disclosure statement. Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 913. The Eighth Circuit found that
the Minnesota statute and the Williams Act required disclosure of the same information and,
therefore, that the Minnesota statute did not conflict with the Williams Act. Id. at 913-14.
The Cardiff court did note that, unlike the Williams Act, the Minnesota statute required
disclosure of the effect of a takeover. Id. at 914; see MiN. STAT. § 80B.03(6)(c) (1986) (requiring
disclosure of effect of takeover). The Cardiff court found, however, that requiring disclosure
of the effect of a takeover offer supported the Williams Act's policy of protecting a shareholder
in a tender offer. Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 914. The Cardiff court held, therefore, that the
Minnesota statute did not violate the Supremacy Clause. Id.
In addition to the Eighth Circuit in Cardiff, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has considered the constitutionality of a post-Mite state takeover statute. See
Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135, 139 (6th Cir. 1986). Fleet Aerospace
involved the constitutionality of Ohio's control share acquisition takeover statute. Id.; see
supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Ohio's takeover statute). In
Fleet Aerospace, Fleet Aerospace Corp. (Fleet) initiated a tender offer for all outstanding
shares of Aeronca, Inc. (Aeronca). Fleet Aerospace, 796 F.2d at 136. Fleet subsequently filed
a complaint with the district court of the Southern District of Ohio requesting that the court
enjoin the enforcement against Fleet of Ohio's control share acquisition statute. Id. Fleet
claimed that the Ohio statute violated the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the
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America v. CTS Corp.8 5 the United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of Indiana's post-Mite takeover statute.86 The Indiana
statute protected certain target company's from "control share acquisi-
tions."'87 Indiana's takeover statute defined a control share acquisition as
an acquisition that would give an acquiror atleast twenty percent, thirty
three and one-third percent, or fifty percent of a target company's stock.
8
The statute applied only to Indiana corporations with more than 100
shareholders and whose principal place of business, principal office, or
substantial assets were in Indiana.s9 Additionally, the statute required that
ten percent, or ten-thousand, of a corporation's shareholders had to reside
in Indiana before the statute applied to the corporation." The Indiana
United States Constitution. Id.
In determining the propriety of Fleet's request for injunctive relief, the district court in
Fleet Aerospace first considered whether the Ohio statute violated the Supremacy Clause. Fleet
Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F.Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986). The district court found
that the Ohio statute delayed the time when an offeror could begin to purchase tendered
shares of a target company beyond the time frame of the Williams Act. Id. at 756-57. The
district court also found that the Ohio statute's provision requiring that shareholders approve
any tender offer favored incumbent management of the target company because offerors would
not undertake a costly, time consumming proxy fight to ensure the success of a tender offer.
Id. at 757-58; see Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(A) (Page Supp. 1986) (shareholder
authorization requirement). Additionally, the district court recognized that by requiring all
shareholders of a target company to vote on a tender offer, the Ohio statute conflicted with
the Williams Act's policy of allowing an individual investor to decide whether to sell the
investor's stock. Fleet Aerospace, 637 F. Supp. at 758-59. The district court held, accordingly,
that the Ohio statute violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at
759; see U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cI. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
After determining that the Ohio statute violated the Supremacy Clause, the district court
in Fleet Aerospace considered whether the Ohio statute violated the Commerce Clause. Fleet
Aerospace, 637 F. Supp. at 759. The district court noted that the Ohio statute potentially
applied to tender offers not involving a single Ohio resident. Id. The district court found,
therefore, that the Ohio staute directly regulated interstate commerce and violated the Com-
merce Clause. Id. at 761. The district court also held that under Mite, the Ohio statute placed
an excessive indirect burden on interstate commerce in relation to the interests the statute
served. Id. at 761-64; see supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing second prong
of Mite's Commerce Clause holding). The district court held that because the Ohio statute
placed an excessive indirect burden on interstate commerce, the statute violated the Commerce
Clause under the second prong of Mite's Commerce Clause test. Fleet Aerospace, 637 F. Supp.
at 761-64; see supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing second prong of Mite's
Commerce Clause holding). On appeal the Sixth Circuit summarily adopted the district court's
reasoning and concluded that the Ohio statute violated the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d
135, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1986).
85. 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
86. Id. at 1641-42; see IND. CODE 23-1-17-1 to 23-1-54-2 (Supp. 1987) (Indiana Business Cor-
poration Law).
87. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (Supp. 1987); See supra note 5 (describing control share
acquisition statutes).
88. IND. CODE 23-1-42-1 (Supp. 1987) (Indiana statute's definition of control share).




statute provided that if the acquisition was a control share acquisition and
if the acquiror filed an information statement with the target company, the
target company's management had fifty days after the acquiror filed the
information statement to hold a shareholder meeting to determine whether
the acquiror's stock would carry voting rights.9' The Indiana statute required
an affirmative vote by a majority of all shares and a majority of all
disinterested shares of the target company prior to giving voting rights to
the acquiror.92 Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics), which already
owned 9.6 percent of CTS Corporation's (CTS) common stock, initiated a
tender offer for the stock of CTS that would have increased Dynamic's
holdings of CTS stock to 27.5 percent. 93 Dynamics filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin
enforcement of the Indiana statute against Dynamics. 94 The district court
held that the Indiana statute violated the Supremacy Clause and the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution. 95 CTS appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.9 6 The Seventh Circuit also held that the Indiana statute violated the
Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause.97 CTS appealed the Seventh
Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court.
91. Id. § 23-1-42-9.
92. Id.
93. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1642.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see Dynamics Corp of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp 389, 406 (N.D.
Ill. 1986)(district court decision).
96. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1643.
97. CTS, 794 F.2d at 252; see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussion of
Indiana statute). On appeal the Seventh Circuit in CTS noted that Indiana's takeover statute
required a raider to hold a tender offer open for fifty days, as opposed to twenty-eight days under
the Williams Act. CTS, 794 F.2d at 251; IN1. CODE § 23-1-42-7 (Supp. 1987); 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-l(a)
(1987) (regulations implementing the Williams Act that provide for timing of tender offers). The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that if Congress enacted the Williams Act to curb hostile takeovers,
then state takeover provisions that impose greater burdens on hostile takeovers than the
Williams Act, like the Indiana statute's fifty-day requirement, would not conflict with the
Williams Act. CTS, 794 F.2d at 262. The CTS court recognized, however, that Congress
intended the Williams Act to evenhandedly protect raiders and management. Id. The CTS
court found that because the Indiana statute, unlike the Williams Act, imposed a delay in the
tender offer process and put an acquiror at the mercy of a target company's disinterested
shareholders, the Indiana statute favored a target companies management and upset the balance
of the Williams Act. Id. at 262-63. The CTS court held, therefore, that the Indiana statute
violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id.; U.S. CoNsr. art. VI,
cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
After determining that the Indiana statute violated the Supremacy Clause, the CTS court
employed the second part of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis in Mite to
determine whether the Indiana statute also violated the Commerce Clause by imposing an
excessive indirect burden on interstate commerce. CTS, 794 F.2d at 263; see Mite, 457 U.S.
at 643-46 (second prong of Mite's Commerce Clause holding); U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(Commerce Clause); supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing second prong of
Mite's Commerce Clause holding). The CTS court first considered Indiana's interest in
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On appeal the Supreme Court in CTS first considered whether the
Indiana statute conflicted with the Williams Act and thus violated the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.9" The Supreme Court
in CTS noted that the Indiana statute required the management of a target
company to hold a shareholders' meeting within fifty days after the com-
mencement of a tender offer to determine whether an acquiror's shares will
carry voting rights.99 The Court in CTS recognized that because an offeror
may not purchase shares until the offeror is certain that the shares will
carry voting rights, the Indiana statute potentially could delay the consum-
mation of a tender offer beyond the twenty-day period in the Williams
Act.100 The Supreme Court in CTS found, however, that the Indiana statutes'
fifty-day provision only delayed an offeror's ability to vote newly acquired
stock and did not actually prevent an offeror from purchasing shares of
the target company's stock once federal law permitted the purchase.' 0'
Accordingly, the Court in CTS found that the Indiana statute did not
conflict with the Williams Act.' 2 Additionally, the Supreme Court in CTS
noted that the Court in Mite had found that a state takeover statute should
not unreasonably delay a takeover bid. 03 The Court in CTS explained that
even if the Indiana statute imposed a delay beyond the timing provisions
regulating tender offers. CTS, 794 F.2d at 263. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that CTS
Corp. (CTS) could invoke the Indiana statute if a small fraction of CTS shareholders lived in
Indiana, but the Seventh Circuit noted that a vast majority of CTS and Dynamics shareholders
resided outside Indiana. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that Indiana had no interest in protecting
nonresident shareholders of an Indiana corporation from a tender offer. Id. The Seventh
Circuit found that because many CTS shareholders resided outside Indiana, the Indiana statute
improperly impaired Dynamics'ability to transact the tender offer with nonresidents. Id. at
263-64. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that CTS presented no evidence that a takeover
by Dynamics would reduce the value of CTS or that Indiana residents would benefit from the
statute. Id. at 264. The CTS court found, therefore, that the Indiana statute imposed an
excessive indirect burden on interstate commerce. Id.
After considering whether the Indiana statute imposed an excessive indirect burden on
interstate commerce, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the Indiana statute avoided
Commerce Clause problems by permissibly regulating the internal affairs of CTS, as opposed
to regulating interstate transactions. Id. The Seventh Circuit explained that Indiana had broad
power to regulate the internal affairs of Indiana corporations even if Indiana's regulation
hindered takeover bids. Id. The Seventh Circuit suggested, for example, that Indiana permissibly
could establish cumulative voting for the boards of directors of Indiana corporations even
though cumulative voting discouraged takeover bids. Id. The CTS court found, however, that
Indiana's statute directly and intentionally affected the interstate market in securities, as
opposed to regulating an Indiana corporation's internal affairs. Id. The CTS court concluded
that because the Indiana statute affected the interstate market in securities and imposed an
excessive indirect burden on this interstate commerce, the statute violated the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).
98. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1644.
99. Id. at 1646-47.
100. Id. at 1647; see 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-l(a) (1987) (regulations implementing the Williams
Act provide that tender offer must remain open for atleast 20 business days).
101. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1647.
102. Id.
103. Id.; Mite, 457 U.S. at 639.
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in the Williams Act, the statute only would conflict with the Williams Act
if the delay was indefinite and unreasonable.I"
In addition to finding that the Indiana statutes' fifty-day provision did
not conflict with the Williams Act, the Supreme Court in CTS advanced
certain policy reasons for upholding the statute against a Supremacy Clause
attack.'0 The Court in CTS explained that many state corporate laws limit
or delay an offeror's ability to exercise power after the offeror successfully
has completed a tender offer.' °6 The Court in CTS recognized that the
courts never have questioned the constitutionality of many of these state
statutes that delay an offeror's ability to exercise power after a tender
offer. 0 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court in CTS noted that the Williams
Act does not preempt a state takeover statute, like the Indiana statute,
merely because the statute delays or limits an offeror's ability to exercise
voting power. 08
After determining that the Indiana statute did not violate the Supremacy
Clause, the Supreme Court in CTS considered whether the statute violated
the Commerce Clause. 0 9 The Court in CTS noted that the Seventh Circuit
found that the statute violated the Commerce Clause because the statute
hindered tender offers." 0 The Court in CTS rejected the Seventh Circuit's
finding that the statute hindered tender offers."' The Court explained that
every state has enacted laws intended to regulate corporate governance but
which incidentally affect interstate commerce." 2 The Court in CTS explained
that states enact laws that regulate corporations to protect shareholders of
the corporation and to promote the state's interest in a stable relationship
among the persons involved in the corporation." 3 The Court noted, for
example, that state corporate laws typically require that a higher percentage
104. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1647.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1648.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1648; see supra note 97 (discussion of the seventh circuit's holding in CTS).
111. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1648-52. The Court in CTS first noted that the courts have closely
scrutinized state statutes, under the Commerce Clause, that directly discriminate against interstate
commerce. Id. at 1648. The Court in CTS recognized, however, that because the Indiana
statute did not impede interstate business more than local business, the statute did not directly
discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. Similarly, the Court found that the Indiana
statute did not impose a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than offerors who resided in
Indiana and thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id.
The Court in CTS also noted that the courts generally have declared state statutes
unconstitutional when the statute adversely affected interstate commerce by subjecting an
activity to inconsistent regulation. Id. The Court noted, however, that under the Indiana
statute, the law of only one state would apply to a corporation. Id. Because the law of only
one state would apply to a corporation under the Indiana statute, the Court in CTS found
that the statute did not inconsistently regulate a corporation. Id.
112. Id. at 1649-50.
113. Id. at 1650.
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of a corporation's shareholders approve a merger as compared to other
transactions. 114 State corporate laws also frequently require a corporation
to buy a minority shareholder's stock at the stock's fair market value if
the shareholder disagrees with a corporate decision and wishes to sell the
stock." -5 The Supreme Court in CTS explained that the merger and minority
shareholder provisions found in most state corporate laws inhibit a corpo-
ration from undertaking certain transactions, yet the courts have not found
that those provisions violate the Commerce Clause.' " Accordingly, the Court
in CTS recognized that a state that creates a corporation can prescribe the
powers and rights of the corporation." 7 The Court in CTS specifically found
that the Indiana statute, which protected shareholders of Indiana corpora-
tions, appropriately provided the state of Indiana with the power to regulate
the corporate governance of Indiana corporations.
8
After determining that the state of Indiana permissibly could regulate
an Indiana corporation's internal affairs, the Supreme Court in CTS ad-
dressed Dynamic's argument that Indiana had no legitimate interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders. 19 The Court in CTS found that Indiana
had no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident cor-
porations. 120 The Court noted, however, that the Indiana statute applied
only to corporations incorporated in Indiana. 21 The Court found that
Indiana has a substantial interest in protecting all of the shareholders of an
Indiana corporation. 22 Additionally, the Supreme Court in CTS noted that
because the Indiana statute applied only to corporations with a substantial
number of shareholders in Indiana, every application of the statute princi-
pally would affect Indiana residents. 23 The Supreme Court in CTS found,
therefore, that the Indiana statute did not violate the Commerce Clause.
124
The Supreme Court's analysis in Mite and CTS suggests that the ATA
does not violate the Supremacy or Commerce Clauses. 25 Unlike the Illinois
statute in Mite, the ATA does not conflict with any provision of the




117. Id. at 1650-51.





123. Id. at 1651-52.
124. Id. at 1652.
125. See Mite, 457 U.S. at 630-46 (Supreme Court's analysis in Mite); CTS, 107 S.Ct. at
1644-52 (Supreme Court's analysis in CTS); U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2 ( Supremacy Clause);
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); supra notes 44-124 and accompanying text
(discussing Mite and CTS).
1 26. See ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 121.5, para. 137.51 (1979) (repealed 1983) (Illinois takeover
statute in Mite); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); see also supra note 51
(describing pertinent provisions of Williams Act.)
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Williams Act interjects full disclosure requirements and rules of fair play
into the actual tender offer process to protect shareholders.' 27 Conversely,
the ATA regulates the second step of a two-tiered transaction, which
typically is a merger of a target company with a shell corporation or a
share exchange between the target and the shell. 2 To initiate a two-tiered
takeover of a Virginia corporation, therefore, a raider's tender offer must
comply with the requirements of the Williams Act and not the ATA.' 29
After the raider completes the tender offer, however, the ATA then governs
the second step of the two-tiered takeover.'30 Because the ATA and the
Williams Act do not regulate the same transaction, the ATA does not
offend the provisions of the Williams Act and thus does not violate the
Supremacy Clause.'
3'
In addition to withstanding scrutiny under the Supremacy Clause, the
ATA does not violate the Commerce Clause under the first prong of the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis in Mite.'32 In Mite a plurality
of the Supreme Court found that Illinois' takeover statute directly burdened
interstate commerce because the statute prevented a raider from completing
an interstate tender offer.'3 3 The plurality in Mite found that the Illinois
statute's direct burden on interstate commerce violated the Commerce
Clause.1 34 The ATA, however, regulates mergers, share exchanges, and
similar transactions occurring at the second stage of a raider's two-tiered
takeover bid, as opposed to the initial tender offer stage.' 35 The ATA does
not stop an interstate tender offer or any tender offer and, therefore, avoids
placing an impermissible direct burden on interstate commerce.
36
Although the ATA does not directly burden interstate commerce, a
raider may be more reluctant to initiate an initial tender offer for stock of
a Virginia corporation if the raider must comply with the provisions of the
127. See supra note 51 (describing pertinent provisions of Williams Act).
128. See supra notes 17-41 and accompanying text (explaining provisions and purposes of
ATA); supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (explaning two-tiered takeovers).
129. See supra note 51 (explaining pertinent provisions of Williams Act).
130. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); supra notes 17-41 and
accompanying text (explaining provisions of ATA).
131. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1981) (Williams Act); VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-725 to - 728 (1985) (ATA).
132. See infra notes 120-147 and accompanying text (discussing ATA under Mite Court's
Commerce Clause analysis); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).
133. See Mite, 457 U.S. at 641-43 (finding that Illinois takeover statute placed direct
burden on interstate commerce); supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing first
part of Mite Court's Commerce Clause analysis).
134. Mite, 457 U.S. at 643 (plurality in Mite found that by directly regulating interstate
commerce, Illinois takeover statute violated Commerce Clause); see supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text (discussing plurality's holding on first part of Mite's Commerce Clause
analysis).
135. See VA. CODE ANNm. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); supra notes 19-30 and
accompanying text (explaining transactions subject to ATA).
136. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); supra notes 19-30 and
accompanying text (explaining transactions subject to provisions of ATA).
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ATA to complete the second step of a takeover. 37 If the ATA deters raiders
from initiating the tender offer stage of a two-tiered takeover, the ATA
may impose an indirect burden on interstate commerce under the second
prong of the Court's Commerce Clause analysis in Mite. 38 Under the
Supreme Court's decision in Mite, a state takeover statute that indirectly
burdens interstate commerce is constitutional only if the indirect burden is
not excessive in relation to the state interests that the statute serves.
39
Although the Supreme Court in CTS explicitly did not provide that the
Court was following the Mite two-prong Commerce Clause analysis, the
Court in CTS considered whether the Indiana statute indirectly hindered,
or burdened, interstate commerce and thus followed the Mite approach.
40
Accordingly, both Mite and CTS suggest that a court will examine whether
the ATA's indirect burden on interstate commerce is excessive in relation
to the state interests that the statute serves.
Virginia corporations provide jobs, create revenue, and generally stim-
ulate the economy in Virginia and, therefore, Virginia has a significant
interest in governing the internal affairs of Virginia corporations.' 4' The
internal affairs of a corporation are the relations between shareholders,
directors, and officers of the corporation, as opposed to the corporation's
relationship with third parties. 42 The provisions of the ATA permit Virginia
to control transactions that could impair substantially the state of the
economy in Virginia. For example, the ATA imposes stricter shareholder
and director voting requirements for certain mergers, share exchanges, and
similar transactions that involve a Virginia corporation. 43 If Virginia could
not regulate the internal affairs of Virginia corporations by means such as
the voting requirements for certain mergers, a Virginia corporation more
easily could approve a merger that might have deleterious economic con-
137. See Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 151 (explaining that ATA may chill tender
offers for stock of Virginia corporations).
138. See id. (ATA may indirectly burden interstate commerce); Mite, 457 U.S. at 643-46
(second prong of Mite Court's Commerce Clause analysis).
139. See Mite, 457 U.S. at 643; supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing Mite
Court's analysis of indirect burden on interstate commerce).
140. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649-52.
141. See Sargent, supra note 80, at 16-17 (1985) (discussing why states have significant
interest in regulating internal affairs of state corporations). Professor Sargent has suggested
that simply because a corporation is incorporated in a particular state does not mean that the
state has a significant enough interest to prescribe the laws that the corporation must follow.
Id. at 22. Professor Sargent has suggested that a state has a significant interest in regulating
a corporation's internal affairs only when the local identity of the corporation is great. Id. at
22-23. For example, the more localized the corporation's ownership and operations, the more
interested the state of incorporation is in regulating the corporation's internal affairs because
the corporation provides domestic jobs, employment, and revenues. Id.
142. See Sargent, supra note 80, at 17 (1985) (discussing distinction between external and
internal affairs).




sequences to the state.'" Because Virginia corporations significantly affect
the states' economy, Virginia has a substantial interest in regulating the
internal affairs of Virginia corporations through statutes such as the ATA.' 45
Additionally, the Supreme Court in CTS expressly recognized that because
a corporation is a creature of state law and because corporations impact a
state's well-being, a state has a significant interest in regulating the internal
affairs of corporations incorporated in the state. 4 The Court in CTS found,
conversely, that a state does not have an interest in regulating the internal
affairs of corporations incorporated outside the state.147 Because the ATA
only governs the internal affairs of Virginia corporations, the Common-
wealth of Virginia, under the CTS rationale, had a significant interest in
enacting the ATA.
Even if the Commonwealth of Virginia's interest in regulating the internal
affairs of domestic corporations is insignificant, the ATA imposes an
insubstantial burden on interstate commerce.' 4 The ATA may chill a raider's
desire to initiate a tender offer and, therefore, burden certain interstate
transactions. 49 However, the ATA merely burdens a tender offer in which
a raider attempts to pay a smaller price to shareholders who do not tender
than to shareholders who tender in the initial offer.' 0 The ATA, therefore,
burdens a coercive tender offer, which renders the burden less substantial.-'
Moreover, the ATA imposes no greater burden on interstate commerce then
other well-established internal affairs provisions in the VSCA that may
hinder interstate commerce.1 5 2 For example, the VSCA provides that a
Virginia corporation may stagger the terms for a corporation's board of
directors or provide for the "for cause" removal of directors in the
company's articles of incorporation. 53 Staggering board terms and requiring
for cause removal for a corporation's board of directors might chill a
raider's desire to initiate a tender offer for the corporation's stock because
144. See Sargent, supra note 80, at 22-23 (state can control its economy by governing
internal affairs).
145. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); supra notes 17-30 and
accompanying text (describing provisions of ATA); supra notes 141-144 and accompanying
text (discussing Virginia's interest in regulating Virginia corporations).
146. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649-51.
147. Id.
148. See Mite, 457 U.S. at 643 (second part of Mite Commerce Clause analysis considers
statute's burden on interstate commerce); infra notes 149-154 and accompanying text (discussing
ATA's burden on interstate commerce).
149. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (ATA may chill raider's desire to initiate
takeover for Virginia corporation).
150. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (explaining two-tiered takeovers).
151. See Scriggins & Clark, supra note 12, at 290 (Maryland takeover statute, which is
similar to ATA, permissibly burdens coercive second step of two-tiered takeovers).
152. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 to -800 (1985) (VSCA); see supra notes 143-144 and
accompanying text (discussing ATA's burden on interstate commerce).
153. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-858 (1985) (VSCA's staggered term for board of directors);
Id. § 13.1-860 (VSCA's for cause removial provision).
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after acquiring control of the stock, the raider immediately cannot control
the corporation's board. 5 4 Finding that the ATA unduly burdens interstate
commerce, therefore, would necessitate a rethinking of other well-established
internal affairs provisions in the VSCA.
Unlike the takeover statute in Mite and like the takeover statute in
CTS, 55 the ATA does not present an insurmountable obstacle to a successful
takeover bid.Y5 6 For example, a raider successfully can acquire a Virginia
corporation through a two-tiered takeover by enlisting approval for the
second step of the takeover from two-thirds of the corporation's remaining
disinterested shareholders."57 A raider may be able to convince the remaining
shareholders that a merger enhances the shareholders' position more than
operating the corporation as a going entity. A raider also can gain approval
for the second transaction of a two-tiered takeover of a Virginia corporation
from a majority of the disinterested directors of the corporation. 58 Addi-
tionally, a raider successfully can complete a two-tiered takeover of a
Virginia corporation by causing the corporation to sell the corporation's
assets to a third party ally of the raider. 159 The raider's ally later can
transfer the corporation's assets to the raider, who then can liquidate the
company and squeeze the remaining shareholders out. A raider can effect
the sale of a Virginia corporation's assets to a third party because the ATA
only imposes supermajority voting requirements on certain sales of a Virginia
154. See Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 152 (noting that staggered terms and for
cause removal burdens interstate commerce). If a corporation's articles of incorporation provide
for staggered board terms, then each year the number of vacancies on the board will not be
a majority of the total number of board members. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBEROER, supra
note 2, at § 6.03[2][a]. Because the number of board vacancies each year is low, raiders cannot
appoint a majority of the board immediately after a takeover of a corporation. Id. In addition
to the deterrent effect of staggered board terms, raiders may not initiate a tender offer for
the stock of a corporation whose articles of incorporation provide for the cause removal of
directors. If a corporation has for cause removal, a raider cannot acquire a majority of the
corporation's stock and then force board members off the board. Conversely, with a for cause
removal provision, a raider can remove a director from the board only for cause.
155. See Mite, 457 U.S. at 626-27 (discussing Illinois takeover statute in Mile); CTS, 107
S.Ct. at 1644-52 (discussing Indiana takeover statute in CTS); ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 121.5, para.
137.51 (1979) (Illinois takeover statute in Mite) (repealed 1983); IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 to -42-13
(Supp. 1987) (Indiana takeover statute in CTS).
156. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to -728 (1985) (ATA); infra notes 157-162 and
accompanying text (ATA is not insurmountable obstacle to takeover bid); supra notes 44-83
and accompanying text (discussing Illinois takeover statute in Mite); supra notes 85-124 and
accompanying text (discussing Indiana takeover statute in CTS).
157. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-726 (1985) (ATA's 2/3 voting requirements for affiliated
transactions).
158. See id. § 13.1-727 (ATA's disinterested directior exception to ATA's two-thirds voting
requirement); supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing ATA's disinterested director
exception).
159. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (1985) (requiring affirmative vote of 2/3 of the
disinterested shareholders prior to sale of Virginia corporation's assets to interested share-




corporation's assets to interested shareholders.' 60 After acquiring a control-
ling block of a Virginia corporation's assets, a raider also could cut the
corporation's dividends to persuade the remaining shareholders to approve
the second step of the two-tiered takeover.' 6' The ATA does not, in effect,
impose an impenetrable burden to two-tiered takeovers and, therefore, does
not violate the Commerce Clause.
62
The ATA signals the end of coercive two-tiered takeovers in Virginia.
6
The ATA does not, however, abolish tender offers for the stock of Virginia
corporations and thus end hostile takeovers in Virginia.' 64 Because the ATA
regulates inherently coercive two-tiered takeovers, but does not abolish the
tender offer process, the Supreme Court is likely to find the ATA less
burdensome than other state takeover statutes and, therefore, constitu-
tional. 16 The Supreme Court's decision in CTS enables the states to under-
take an active role in the takeover process and the ATA represents Virginia's
first move in that direction.
DAvID A. WALSH
160. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (1985) (prohibiting sale of Virginia corporation's
assets to interested shareholders, but not to third parties).
161. See Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 18, at 152 (explaining that interested shareholder
can cut dividends to avoid ATA).
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 (Commerce Clause); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 to
-728 (1985) (ATA).
163. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (discussing two-tiered takeovers and
the coercive effect of two-tiered takeovers).
164. See supra nctes 17-30 and accompanying text (explaining ATA's provisions).
165. Id.
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